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CERTAINTY AND FINALITY ... I

CERTAINTY AND FINALITY
IN THE NISGA' A AGREEMENT
JESSICA BOWERINGI

ABSTRACT

The 1998 Agreement between the Nisga'a people of Northern BC,
the federal government, and the government of BC, is a treaty protected
under s.35 of the Canadian Constitution. Existing s.35 jurisprudence
allows treaties to be infringed by government so long as the government
can justify the infringement under the Sparrow test. In the one significant court case dealing with the Nisga'a Agreement, it was assumed that
this jurisprudence applied.
In this paper, the author argues that the Sparrow test ought not to be
applied in the context of modem treaties such as the Nisga' a Agreement.
Modem treaties, negotiated between equal parties in the light of Charter
protection, should not be interpreted according to the special rules that
have been developed for interpreting pre-Charter agreements. In order
to achieve the reconciliation purpose of treaty making, modern treaties
should be respected and courts should intervene as little as possible. On
the express wording of the Nisga'a Agreement, the parties intended it to
be a full and final settlement. The courts should give effect to that
intention.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Nisga'a people of northern British Columbia have recently
settled their claims with the governments of Canada and British Columbia. The Agreement became effective on May 11, 2000. 1 It is a compreI Before coming to Dalhousie Law School, Jessica Bowering worked for a Member of the
Legislative Assembly of B.C. She graduated from Simon Fraser University with a B.A. in
Philosophy and Women's Studies, and will obtain her LLB in 2002.
1
Nisga 'a Final Agreement, (Canada, British Columbia, Nisga'a Nation) August 4, 1998
[hereinafter Agreement].
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hensive Agreement covering title to land, financial compensation, resource agreements, and self-government provisions. It is explicitly intended to be a "treaty and a land claims agreement within the meaning of
sections 25 and 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, "2 to be binding on the
parties, 3 and to be a full and final settlement of the Nisga'a people's s.35
rights. 4 In this paper, I argue that, in order to achieve the purposes of
treaty making, the courts should give effect to this intention.
This argument begins with an exploration of the purposes of s.35,
and how the Nisga'a Agreement fulfills these purposes. There have
already been attempts to invalidate the Agreement in court. 5 The political atmosphere in British Columbia and experience with treaties in other
2

Ibid. at c.2, s.1; Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K. ),
1982, c.11, ss.25, 35 [hereinafter Constitution Act, 1982].
The text of s.25 reads:
The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be
construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other
rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada including
(a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763; and
(b) any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired.
[hereinafter s. 25].
The text of s.35 reads:
(I) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of
Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.
(2) In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes the Indian, Inuit
and Metis peoples of Canada.
(3) For greater certainty, in subsection (I) "treaty rights" includes rights
that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so
acquired.
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the aboriginal and
treaty rights referred to in subsection (I) are guaranteed equally to
male and female persons.
[hereinafter s.35].
3 Agreement, supra note 1 at c.2, s.2.
4
Ibid. at c.2, s.23 ..
5 Campbell v. British Columbia (Attomey General), [2000] 189 D.L.R. (4tl') 333, 8 W.W.R.
600 [hereinafter Campbell cited to DLR]; Nisga 'a Tribal Council v. Nisga 'a Tribal Council,
[ 1998] B.C.J. No. 3254 (SC), aff' d [ 1998] B.C.J. No. 2395 (C.A); B. C. Citizens First Society
v. British Columbia (AG), [1999] B.C.J. No. 120 (S.C.); B.C. Fisheries Survival Coalition v.
Canada, [1999] B.C.J. No. 660 (S.C.).
6
R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at para. 62, 70 D.L.R. (4'") 385 [hereinafter Sparrow
cited to S.C.R.].
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provinces, suggest that the Agreement will continue to be threatened by
legal challenges. The purpose of s.35 requires that the Agreement be
upheld and recognition and respect be given to the intentions of the
parties as documented in the Agreement. The judicial responses to the
legal challenges so far have been co1Tect in ultimately upholding the
legality of the Agreement, but have unwisely imported the s.35 analysis
that has been developed in the context of treaties pre-dating the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms. Modem treaties deserve special consideration
and protection under s.35.

II.

THE PURPOSES OF SECTION

35

Recognition of Aboriginal rights, most notably in the Constitution
Act, 1982, has created a dilemma for governments. Although most
governments now willingly acknowledge that existing treaties between
Aboriginal people and the Crown impose a moral obligation on both
parties, governments are increasingly being forced to recognize that
these obligations are legally enforceable. Governments must find a way
to meet those obligations in the context of a myriad of other obligations
and commitments to non-Aboriginals, many of which may be incompatible with the rights of Aboriginal people. For example, an Aboriginal
band may lay claim to land that is cun-ently owned, lived on, or worked
on, by non-Aboriginal people. These conflicts may also arise in relation
to Aboriginal claims to parkland, or lands subject to resource extraction
agreements. Detem1ining and enforcing Aboriginal rights without considering these factors would cause chaos. On the other hand, Aboriginal
rights exist, and they have gone unrecognized for far too long; Aboriginal people are entitled to have their rights recognized in theory, but also
recognised and respected in concrete form. They are not responsible for
the competing interests of non-Aboriginals, and should not have their
rights abrogated simple because they conflict with those of non-Aboriginal Canadians.
The courts have recognized this dilemma and have been loathe to
make unqualified declarations of Aboriginal rights for fear of upsetting
the balance between competing interests. Rather, the Supreme Court of
Canada has been careful to make clear that the Aboriginal rights recog-

4
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nized by s.35 are qualified by Crown sovereignty. In Sparrow, the
Supreme Court of Canada held that,
rights that are recognized and affirmed are not absolute. Federal
legislative powers continue ... These powers must, however, now be
read together with s.35(1). In other words, federal power must be
reconciled with federal duty and the best way to achieve that reconciliation is to demand the justification of any government regulation that
infringes upon or denies aboriginal rights. 6

In R v. Van der Peet, Chief Justice Lamer (as he then was) said the
purpose of s.35 was to "provide the constitutional framework through
which the fact that aboriginals lived on the land in distinctive societies,
with their own practices, traditions and cultures, is acknowledged and
reconciled with the sovereignty of the Crown." Further, he stated that
"[t]he substantive rights which fall within the provision must be defined
in light of this purpose." 7 Clearly, the Supreme Court of Canada is of the
view that Aboriginal rights are to be defined by balancing the rights of
Aboriginal people and the sovereignty of the Crown. In cases where
Aboriginal rights and Crown sovereignty conflict, it is the courts who
must decide how the balance should be struck.
In finding this balance, the courts have also made it clear that
negotiation is preferable to litigation. In its unanimous judgement in
Sparrow, the Supreme Court of Canada held s.35(1) provides" a solid
constitutional base upon which subsequent negotiations can take
place." 8 In Van der Peet, s.35 was called a "constitutional framework for
reconciliation."9 Perhaps the clearest direction from the comi on the
issue of negotiation came in Delgamuukw:
[T]he Crown is under a moral, if not a legal, duty to enter into and
conduct those negotiations in good faith. Ultimately, it is through
negotiated settlements, with good faith and give and take on all sides,
reinforced by the judgments of this Court, that we will achieve what I
stated in Van der Peet ... to be a basic purpose of s.35( 1) - "the

R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at para. 62, 70 D.L.R. (4' 11 ) 385 [hereinafter Sparrow
cited to S.C.R.].
7
R v. Van der Peet, [ 1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at para. 31, 137 D.L.R. (4' 11 ) 289 [hereinafter Van der
Peet cited to S.C.R.].
8
Sparrow, supra note 6 at para. 53.
9
Van der Peet, supra note 7 at para. 42.
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reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the
sovereignty of the Crown". Let us face it, we are all here to stay. 10

Section 35 has always been intended to be defined through negotiation and compromise. Section 35 was added at the same time as was
s.37, which originally called for one conference on the topic of "constitutional matters that directly affect the aboriginal people of Canada" and
was amended to include three additional conferences. II Although ultimately unsuccessful, the "primary purpose of these conferences was
... to identify and define Aboriginal and treaty rights."I 2 Subsequent
jurisprudence has given s.35 some meaning in the absence of constitutional amendments, but it has also confirmed that the content of s.35 can
better be defined through negotiation and agreement.
The jurisprudence could have gone a different way. lfthe purpose of
s.35 was only "the recognition of the prior occupation of North America
by aboriginal peoples" 13 or some other formulation that recognized
Aboriginal rights as truly inherent, there would be no basis for Crown
limitation of those rights, and no need to negotiate with the Crown in
order to give definition to those rights. Arguably, there would be no
basis for the assertion of Crown sovereignty in the first place, given that
the Constitution "provides no historical context or justification for the
assumption that Canada exists."I 4 In theory this is a supportable interpretation of s.35, but its practical implications are so drastic that it
appears never to have been seriously considered by the Supreme Comi
of Canada. The argument in this paper - that governments should not be
able to infringe the s.35 rights that have been defined by the Nisga'a
Agreement (and by other post-1982 agreements) - is based on the
premises that one of the purposes of s.35 is reconciliation, and that
treaties are a recognized way to define s.35 rights in lieu of a constitutional agreement.

10
Delgamuukiv v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 at para. 182, 153 D.L.R. (4tll) 193
[hereinafter Delganwukw cited to S.C.R.].
11
M. Asch, "Aboriginal Self-Government and the Construction of Canadian Constitutional
Identity" ( 1992) 30 Alta. L. Rev. (No. 2) 465 at 475, online: QL (JOUR).
12
Ibid. at 475.
13
R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 at para. 72, 137 D.L.R. (4'h) 468 [hereinafter Gladstone
cited to S.C.R.].
14 Asch, supra note 11 at 474.
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III. INTERPRETING THE NISGA' A AGREEMENT

1. The Purpose of the Nisga'a Agreement
The Crown colony of British Columbia refused to recognize Aboriginal rights, and, up until 1991, B.C. refused to participate in the
treaty process. The Nisga'a people had been diligently pursuing their
claim for over a hundred years when the B.C. government finally came
to the negotiating table. In 1885, three Nisga'a chiefs traveled to Ottawa
to meet with Prime Minister John A. MacDonald. In 1886, the Nisga'a
refused to allow land surveying by provincial crews and began an
organized process to support their claim. They traveled to the Legislature in Victoria in 1887 and were refused entry to the building. In 1907,
they created the Nisga'a Land Committee and initiated an unsuccessful
petition for recognition to the Privy Council. There was a period of
relative inactivity between 1927 and 1951 when the Indian Act prohibited raising money for the purpose of pursuing land claims. Finally, in
1969 the Nisga' a brought a court action claiming Aboriginal title to their
ancestral land. In Calder v. A.G. of B.C., 15 the majority of the Supreme
Court of Canada recognized the existence of Aboriginal title, although
the Court did not recognize the Nisga'a claim in this case. 16 Following
the Calder decision, the Federal government began negotiations with
the Nisga'a. In 1991 B.C. agreed to participate.17
The Nisga'a have been seeking an agreement with the Crown for a
long time. Primarily they have sought recognition of their right to their
land. Ancillary to this they have been seeking recognition of their
inherent right to self-government, and a mechanism for exercising that
right, as well as guaranteed access to resources and economic opportunities. They also wanted financial compensation for the loss of their land
and for the historic suppression of their rights. To make the process
meaningful, it was critical that these rights be guaranteed and that the
[1973] S.C.R. 313, 34 D.L.R. (3"1) 145 [hereinafter Calder cited to S.C.R.].
Three of the seven judges held that the Nisga'a Aboriginal title had been extinguished and
one judge declined to determine the issue.
17 T.R. Berger, "The Importance of the Nisga'a Treaty to Canadians" (C01Ty Lecture, Queen's
University, Kingston, Ontario, October 2, 1999)], online: The People of the Nass Valley
<www.ntc.bc.ca/speeches/berger2.html> (date accessed: February 6, 2001); D. Sanders, "
'We Intend to Live Here Forever': A Primer on the Nisga'a Treaty" (1999) 33 U.B.C. L. Rev.
103.
15

16
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Nisga'a people be able to pursue economic and community development with security and certainty. These goals have all been recognized
in the Agreement, although the Nisga'a people have certainly not gotten
everything that they wanted. 18
In order for the Nisga'a Agreement to effect true reconciliation
between the Nisga'a and the Crown, it must reflect the goals of all the
parties. Reconciliation requires that the treaty be understood and respected by the non-Native population, as well as the Nisga'a people. In
the wake of the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in
MacMillan Bloedel v. Mullin, which held that Aboriginal title is an
encumberance on Crown rights to forested land, 19 it has become widely
accepted in B.C. that there is investment uncertainty in logging activity
on land claimed by Aboriginals. "If MacMillan Bloedel [now
Weyerhaeuser], the largest forest company in the province, can be
stopped from exercising logging rights that they hold under provincial
law, it is not business as usual." 20 Resolving this problem of uncertainty
in land claims is an important priority for non-native governments.
The Provincial and Federal Governments have made their goals in
treaty negotiations very clear. The B.C. Treaty Commission says that
treaties are designed to achieve reconciliation, certainty, reduced conflict, and constitutional protection. 21 In promotional materials, both the
B.C. and Federal Governments have emphasized certainty and reduced
conflict, among other things, as the benefits of treaties. From the perspective of non-Aboriginal governments, establishing with certainty
their legal and ethical obligation is key to stability in government
planning, and serving private-sector investment.
Thomas Berger22 described the consequences of British Columbia's
failure to enter into treaties with First Nations as "hostility, uncertainty,
mistrust and a multitude oflawsuits."23 These are the problems to which
the parties are responding in the Nisga'a Agreement; the Agreement is
one step toward achieving the final goals of finality and certainty.
18

The People of the Nass Valley, online <www.ntc.bc.ca> (date accessed: February 6, 2001).
Haida Nation v. B.C., [1997] 153 D.L.R. (41h) I, 98 B.C.A.C. 42 (C.A.).
20
Sanders, supra note 17 at para. I 0.
21
What Will Treaties Accomplish?, online: B.C. Treaty Commission <www.bctreaty.net/
miscellany/trbk-what.html> (date accessed: April 16, 200 I).
22
The lawyer who argued Calder, supra note 15 on behalf of the Nisga'a.
23 Berger, supra note 17.
1"
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Moreover, as the B.C. Treaty Commission puts it, the purpose of the
Nisga'a Agreement is "to establish a new relationship based on mutual
respect, trust, and understanding." 24
2. The Relationship Between s. 35 and the Nisga'a Agreement
Peter Hogg has said that the Nisga'a people "already have constitutionally entrenched rights as aboriginal rights, so this [the Agreement] is
substituting one set ofrights for another." He says that the treaty should
be seen as a formal recognition of existing rights protected by s. 35. 25
This is an endorsement of the idea that the Agreement does not add to
the s. 35 rights of the Nisga'a, but rather defines and delineates the
existing rights. What the Nisga'a already had was underdetermined,
since it was dependent on a judicial statement of their rights and of the
extent of the Crown's ability to infringe those rights. This has been
replaced by the Agreement, which represents a comprehensive and
binding compromise between the parties.
This is not to say that the Nisga'a Agreement simply defines rights
the Nisga'a could have otherwise won in court. There is no way to know
with any certainty how a court would have interpreted existing Nisga'a
rights. For example, consistent with federal (and provincial) negotiating
policy, 26 the Nisga'a Agreement recognizes at least a limited form of
inherent self-government. This may well go beyond what the courts
would have recognized had the matter been litigated. In R. v.
Pamajewon, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the same legal
standard applies to self-government as would apply to any other Aboriginal right. 27 This makes it very difficult to establish a right to selfgovernment, given the test laid out in Van der Peet in which the first step
is to specifically characterize the right claimed without reference to the
significance of the right. 28 Arguably, an Aboriginal group would have to
B.C. Treaty Commission, supra note 22.
"Nisga'a deal doesn't require referendum" The Vancouver Sun (July 30, 1998) online:
<www.bc-mining-house.com/news/vs_30g98.htm> (accessed February 6, 2001 ).
26
Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Aboriginal Self-Government: The Government
of Canada's Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of
Aboriginal Self-Government (Federal Policy Guide) (Ottawa, 1995), online: Indian and
Northern Affairs Canada <www.inac.gc.ca/pr/pub/sg/plcy_e.html> (date accessed: February
6, 200l)[hereinafter Federal Policy Guide].
27
R. v. Pamajewon, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 82lat para. 24, 138 D.L.R. (4'h) 204.
28
Van der Peet, supra note 7.

24

25

CERTAINTY AND FINALITY ... 9

establish an Aboriginal right "for each and every head of jurisdiction it
wishes to exercise"29 using this test.
In contrast, the Agreement gives content to the protected s. 35 rights,
regardless of how the courts might have interpreted them otherwise. It is
a basic principle of treaty law that "nations may impose on themselves
obligations where none existed before"30 and "[n]egotiations among
governments and Aboriginal peoples are clearly preferable as the most
practical and effective way to implement the inherent right of selfgovernment."31 Section 35 protects the rights enumerated in treaties
regardless of whether they would otherwise have been deemed protected
Aboriginal rights.
3. The Content of the Nisga'a Agreement Demonstrates the Intent
of the Parties

As I have established, a final and certain dete1mination of rights is a
key purpose of the Agreement for all the parties. This is clear from the
history of the negotiations and from the motives leading the parties to
negotiate. It is also clear from the terms of the treaty itself. The Chapter
on General Provisions contains a number of references to finality:
specifically, the Agreement states it is binding on the parties; 32 prevails
over the provisions of any federal or provincial law in the event of an
inconsistency or conflict; 33 permits no party to challenge or support a
challenge to the validity of any provision of the Agreement, 34 and
requires the agreement of all parties to amend the Agreement. 35 There
are also a number of provisions that make it clear that the Agreement
exhaustively defines the Aboriginal rights of the Nisga'a people 36 , including exhaustively setting out the s.35 rights of the Nisga'a people. 37

29

B.W. Morse, "Permafrost Rights: Aboriginal Self-Government and the Supreme Court in R.
v. Pamajewon" ( 1997) 42 McGill L.J. 1011 at I 036.
30
J. [Sakej] Youngblood Henderson, "Interpreting Sui Generis Treaties" (1997) 36 Alta. L.
Rev. (No. I) 46 at 49 online: QL (JOUR).
31
Federal Policy Guide, supra note 27.
32
Agreement, supra note 1 at c. 2, s. 2.
33
Ibid. at c. 2, s. 13.
34
Ibid. at c. 2, s. 20.
35
Ibid. at c. 2, s. 36.
36
Ibid. at c. 2, ss. 22-27
37
Ibid. at c. 2, s. 23.
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The parties would have been aware of the Sparrow justification test
as they negotiated the Agreement. 38 The Sparrow test, which was expanded in Badger to include treaty rights, 39 allows s.35 rights to be
infringed if the government can justify the infringement. That is, the
government must demonstrate a valid legislative objective and show
that the infringement is consistent with the honour of the Crown, including the obligations to consult the affected people, to ensure as little
infringement of the right as possible, and to provide compensation. 40
Yet, rather then allow the Agreement to be infringed so long as the
infringements could be justified on that standard, the parties choose to
give the Agreement internal limitations and justificatory standards. The
internal limitations and standards serve the purposes of the parties in a
more tailored way than the all-purpose Sparrow test. The Sparrow test is
therefore redundant to resolving disputes arising out of the agreement.
Whereas the Sparrow test makes federal and provincial laws paramount where the paramountcy can be justified, the Agreement specifies
which laws will be paramount under paiiicular heads of power. Federal
or provincial law will prevail in areas such as public order, peace and
safety,41 traffic and transportation, 42 provision of social services, 43 health
services,44 and emergency preparedness. 45 The government may intervene in these areas without meeting any justificatory standards, presumably because these are areas where the public interest is most pressing.
In other areas, Nisga'a laws are paramount, provided that they meet or
exceed provincial or federal standards, or receive provincial or federal
approval. Such areas include child and family services,46 Aboriginal
healers, 47 adoption, 48 police services, 49 and court services. 50 In these
Sparrow was decided in 1990 and the Nisga'a Agreement in Principle was concluded in
1996.
39
R. v. Badger, [1996] I S.C.R. 771at para. 73, 133 D.L.R. (4'1 1) 324 [hereinafter Badger cited
to S.C.R.].
40
This is not an exhaustive list of justification criteria. Sparrow, supra note 6 at para. 83.
41 Agreement, supra note 1 at c.11, s.62.
42
Ibid. at c.11, s.74.
43
Ibid. at c. 11, s. 79.
44
Ibid. at c.11, s.83.
45
Ibid. at c.11, s.123.
46
Ibid. at c.11, s.91
47
Ibid. at c.11, s.86.
48
Ibid. at c.11, s.96.
49
Ibid. at c.12, s.4.
50
Ibid. at c.12, s.34.

38
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areas, government can only intervene where its law sets a higher standard than that set by Nisga'a law. Finally, there are areas of core cultural
imp01iance where Nisga'a laws are paramount without any ability for
provincial and federal intervention. 51
The Sparrow test, as it been expanded in subsequent jurisprudence,52
outlines the types of objectives that will be sufficient to justify infringement. Instead of relying on the operation of Sparrow, the Agreement
makes clear the objectives that can justify limitation in specific areas.
The only objective explicitly deemed relevant to fishing rights in the
Agreement, 53 and in Sparrow, is conservation. 54 The Agreement goes
further than what was contemplated in Sparrow, and makes fishing
rights subject to "legislation enacted for the purposes of public health or
public safety."55 Nisga'a law in relation to forest resources must include
"forest standards that meet or exceed forest standards established under
forest practices legislation applicable to Crown land."56 The Nisga'a are
required to make laws that meet the standards the federal or provincial
government dete1mine are in the public interest. The limits in the
agreement are generally consistent with the Sparrow test, but where
there is a difference, the parties must be taken to have intended that
difference.
The Nisga'a Agreement as a whole, with its detailed description of
the rights of the Nisga'a people, including the limits on those rights, and
its express statements of finality, makes it clear that the paiiies intended
the Agreement to be a full and final determination of both Nisga'a right
under s.35 and government's ability to affect those rights.
4. The Effect of Party Intentions on the Government's Ability to
Infringe the Agreement
One might argue that the actual intentions of the paiiies in negotiating the Agreement are not relevant in determining whether the Agreement can be infringed. After all, the Constitution is the "supreme law of
51
See for example Ibid. at c.11, s.40 (Nisga 'a Citizenship), s 41 (Culture and Language) and
s.115 (devolution of cultural property)
52 See for example Gladstone, supra note 13; Badger supra note 40.
53 Agreement, supra note I at c.8, s. l (a)
54 Sparrow, supra note 6 at para. 73.
55 Agreement, supra note 1 at c 8, s.1 (b ).
56
Ibid. at c.5, s 8.
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Canada"57 and the Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted the Constitution as allowing governments to infringe treaties so long as they can
meet the justificatory standard set out in Sparrow. This argument is
based on a misunderstanding of what is necessary to create a workable
treaty. Treaties are explicitly recognized by s. 35, and the courts have
called on the parties to give effect to s.35 rights through treaties. Therefore, s.35 must create and protect the tools necessary to make and
enforce treaties. Those tools include the power to make treaties that
achieve the goals of the parties, including certainty and finality.
Treaties are, by definition, compromises: each party gets some of
what they want and neither party gets everything they want. If one party
has the power to unilaterally shift this balance and, if the intentions of all
parties are not relevant in determining what is protected, then a treaty
does not "establish a new relationship based on mutual respect, trust,
and understanding." 58 Section 35, as the courts have interpreted it,
requires that the treaty process have credibility. The credibility of the
treaty process requires that the intentions of the parties in negotiating
agreements be respected. Berger put the issue this way:
It is unrealistic to think that, ifthe Nisga'a Treaty is scuttled, it will be
possible to negotiate with First Nations in this province. You can't tear
up a document painfully arrived at after 20 years of negotiation, and
expect the Nisga 'a to negotiate for another 20 years.

If we reject the Nisga'a treaty, the goodwill that has been won, the
treaty process that is under way, the steps towards reconciliation that
have been taken - all will be lost in a welter of hostility and recrimination.59

It has been argued more generally that it is inappropriate 60 to apply the
Sparrow test to treaties at all.
The solemn nature of treaties as representative of the agreements made
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples and their existence as
Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 2 at s.52( I) The text of this section reads:
The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent
with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or
effect.
58
B.C. Treaty Commission, supra note 22.
59
Berger, supra note 17.
60
Especially when the range of objectives that can serve to justify infringements is broadened
beyond conservations as it was in Gladstone, supra note 13.

57
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negotiated compacts suggest that any attempt to abrogate the rights
contained within them ought to be subject to a more onerous test than
that applied to Aboriginal rights. 61

The Supreme Court of Canada has clearly rejected this argument. 62
However, the argument is stronger in the context of modem treaties that
are evidently intended to be an exhaustive description of the rights and
obligations of the parties. There is an opportunity for courts to distinguish previous case law on this basis. At a minimum, there must be a
recognition that the parties intended it to be very difficult, if not impossible, to unilaterally alter the terms of the Agreement.

IV.

THREATS To THE AGREEMENT

1. Campbell v. Attorney-General of British Columbia
Shortly after the Agreement was signed it was challenged in court by
then Leader of the B.C. Liberal Party and now Premier ofB.C., Gordon
Campbell. The B.C. Supreme Court rejected the claim. 63 At the time Mr.
Campbell declared an intention to appeal the decision, 64 although since
being elected Premier he has dropped the appeal in favour of holding a
provincial referendum on treaty negotiations in general.
The political context of the comi challenge makes the threat particularly interesting. Although the argument failed in court, there is obviously political will to undermine the Agreement. The window for government intervention that s.35 jurisprudence has left open is of particular
concern in this context.
In Campbell, the plaintiffs made three arguments. First, they argued
that ss.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 186765 create an exhaustive
division of legislative power, and therefore, the legislative jurisdiction
granted to the Nisga'a people by the Agreement is inconsistent with the
61
L.I. Rotman, "Defining Parameters: Aboriginal Rights, Treaty Rights, and the Sparrow
Justificatory Test" (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. (No. 1) 149 at 168, online: QL (JOUR).
62
Badger, supra note 40. R v. Cote, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, 138 D.L.R. (4' 11 ) 385.
6
) Campbell, supra note 5.
64 B.C. Liberals, Press Release "Nisga'a Judgment to be Appealed" (July 24, 2000) online:
<www .bcliberals.com/news/newsarchive/news0724001.htm> (date accessed: Febmary 6,
2001).
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Constitution, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5, s. 91,
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Constitution. Justice Williamson considered the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867, which "invites the use of. .. organizing principles to fill
out the gaps in the express terms of the constitutional scheme"66 and
found that it provides recognition of the diminished form of self-government that was recognized by British Imperial policy. He found that the
purpose of the federal-provincial division of powers was "not to extinguish diversity (or aboriginal rights). " 67 He also considered the finding
in Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band that "[f]rom the aboriginal perspective, any federal-provincial divisions that the Crown has imposed on
itself are internal to itself and do not alter the basic structure of Sovereign-Indian relations." 68 Justice Williamson concluded that "after the
assertion of sovereignty by the British Crown, and continuing to and
after the time of Confederation, although the right of aboriginal people
to govern themselves was diminished, it was not extinguished. " 69
In coming to this conclusion, Justice Williamson relied on the
proposition in Sparrmv and Badger that the Crown retains the right to
infringe Aboriginal and treaty rights, "subject to its ability to justify
such interference in a manner consistent with the honour of the
Crown." 70 According to the court, this limitation on treaty rights "is an
answer to the submission that the constitutional entrenchment of the
Nisga'a Treaty amounts to a permanent abdication by Parliament of its
right to interfere with decisions of the Nisga'a Lisims Government
taking into account the impact of those decisions upon the greater public
good." 71
The second argument made by the plaintiffs in Campbell was that
since the Nisga'a Agreement pennits laws that do not require assent
from either the Governor General or the Lieutenant Governor, it is a
violation of the principle of Royal Assent, set out in s. 55 of the
Constitution Act, 1867. 72 The plaintiffs relied on a statement in re The
66
Campbell supra note 5 at para. 66, citing Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the
Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 at 69.
67 Ibid. at para. 78.
68
Ibid. at para. 80, citing [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85 at 108-9.
69
Ibid. at para. 179.
70
Ibid. at para. 121.
71
Ibid. at para. 128.
72 Constitution Act, I 867, supra note 66 at s.55. The text of the section reads:
Where a Bill passed by the Houses of the Parliament is presented to the
Governor General for the Queen's Assent, he shall declare, according to
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Initiatives and Referendum Act, that while a legislature can delegate
legislation
"... it does not follow that it can create and endow with its own
capacity a new legislative power not created by the British North
America Act to which it owes its own existence."73

This statement was obiter, but the Supreme Court of Canada has said
that
"it may stand for the wider proposition that the power of constitutional
amendment given to the provinces by s.92(1) of the Constitution Act,
1867 does not necessarily comprise the power to bring about a profound constitutional upheaval by the introduction of political institutions foreign to and incompatible with the Canadian system."74

Justice Williamson distinguished the Nisga'a Agreement from the
kind of "profound constitutional upheaval" envisioned by that case by
pointing out that the powers granted to the Nisga'a are limited both by
the internal terms of the treaty and by the limited promise of s.35,
meaning that s.35 protects treaties subject to justified government infringement. He also pointed out that the wording of s.55 does not "on its
wording apply to other [non Parliamentary] law making bodies." 75 However, in responding to both this and the previous argument about division of powers, he relied heavily on the fact that the Nisga'a powers are
limited and therefore not an undue abrogation of Parliamentary authority.
The final argument made by the petitioners is that the Agreement
violates s.3 of the Charter, 76 which provides the right to vote in elections
for the House of Commons or the Legislative Assembly. Justice
Williamson dealt with this point summarily, pointing out that the rights
his Discretion, but subject to the Provisions of this Act and to Her
Majesty's Instructions, either that he assents thereto in the Queen's Name,
or that he withholds the Queen's Assent, or that he reserves the Bill for the
Signification of the Queen's Pleasure.
73
Campbell, supra note 5 at para. 147 citing [ 1919] A.C. 935 (J.C.P.C.) at 945.
74 Ibid. at para. 148 citing OPSEU v. Ontario (Attorney General), [ 1987] 2 S.C.R. 2 at 4 7.
75
Ibid. at para. 150.
76
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, supra note
2 at s.3. The text of this section reads:
Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members of
the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for
membership therein.
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guaranteed by s.3 are limited to the House of Commons and the Legislative Assembly. As well, he found that s.25, 77 which protects treaty rights
from abrogation by the Charter, provides a complete defence to this
argument.
In the final analysis, Justice Williamson rejected each of the arguments that would have invalidated the Agreement. He says that "what
Canada, British Columbia and the Nisga'a have achieved in the Nisga'a
Final Agreement is consistent both with what the Supreme Court of
Canada has encouraged, and consistent with the purpose of s.35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982."78 However, I believe that by relying on the
ability of the Crown to infringe s.35, he actually provided the opening
for "what the Supreme Court of Canada has encouraged" and "the
purpose of s.35" to be undermined. As I have outlined above, Justice
Williamson had an alternate ground for rejecting each argument that the
Nisga'a Agreement is unconstitutional. He did not need to rely on the
idea that s.35 provides limited protection. Any limits on the rights of
Aboriginal people that are constitutionally required in order to reconcile
those rights with Crown sovereignty are provided by the limitations that
the parties have chosen and are already included within the framework
of the Nisga'a Agreement.
Interestingly, the Nisga'a Nation accepted, for the purposes of the
Campbell proceedings, that the Nisga'a Agreement was negotiated "in
full knowledge of the limited effect. .. of the constitutional promise of
s.35."79 Most likely, in the context of the dispute, this was not seen as the
most effective or appropriate battle. Alternatively, the ability of governments to infringe treaty rights may have become so entrenched in
Canadian jurisprudence that it did not occur to the Nisga'a Nation (or
their counsel) to question it. It is a premise that has been simply assumed
in the limited Canadian judicial and academic pronouncements on the
subject. 80 Nonetheless, it remains a premise open to serious question.
2. Experience with Other Agreements
The experience of other First Nations with modern land claims
agreements further suggests that those who are concerned with the
77

Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 2 at s. 25.
Campbell, supra note 5 at para. 171.
79 Ibid. at para. 182.
80
See for example Sanders, supra note 17 at para. 56.
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success of the treaty process in achieving good will, certainty, trust and
an end to litigation have reason to be concerned. The 1975 James Bay
and Northern Quebec Agreement8 1 is the longest standing "modem"
treaty. 82 The self-government rights in the JBNQA are much more
limited then those in the Nisga'a agreement. It was primarily intended to
be an agreement dealing with rights to land and resource development.
In spite of its differences, it provides some insight into the problems that
can arise throughout the life of an agreement, despite the best intentions
of the parties at the time of entering the agreement.
The federal and Quebec governments have a "reputation [of] being
unable and unwilling to implement" the terms of the JBNQA. 83 The
Quebec government has taken the position that it maintains unilateral
control over native self-government84 and has used the JBNQA to support its argument that the claims of other Aboriginal people have been
extinguished. 85 This assertion of unilateral power over a negotiated
agreement, as well as the pitting of one Aboriginal group against another, has continued to breed mistrnst. 86 The result of this mistrnst is that
the Cree 87 "have been in court virtually every year over the past twenty
years to defend their rights and ensure their just entitlements." 88
This is precisely the kind of result that should be avoided. As I have
already discussed , and as the courts have repeatedly pointed out, it is not
in anyone's best interest to have continued litigation over Aboriginal
rights. The JBNQA is a cautionary tale. It tells us that, over the long
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term, we cannot simply rely on the good faith of the parties involved to
enforce an agreement. It must be given legally enforceable protection
against threats that may arise in the future, as governments and priorities
change. In addition, it tells us that that protection must be clear and
unequivocal to prevent a litany oflitigation as parties continue to test the
limits.
The Quebec position is unique, and it could be argued that other
governments will not behave in the same way. For example, Quebec has
"repeatedly asserted that it will develop the Cree Nation territory at its
own sovereign discretion" and that a referendum on the Cree's right to
determine their own future will not be recognized. 89 The Quebec government has taken the position that in a secessionist Quebec, Quebec will be
able to assume the obligations of the federal government and subject
treaties to a new Quebec Constitution. This result was never negotiated
and is an example of the kind of unilateral assertion of power that has
bred uncertainty and mistrust. 90 It does not necessarily apply in other
provmces.
However, all governments are concerned with maintaining, and in
many cases increasing, their legislative authority. The provincial and
federal governments are consistently involved in jurisdictional disputes
with each other. 91 In many of these cases, these disputes arise from
legitimate and sincere disagreements as to how the needs of Canadians
as federal and provincial citizens are best served. Is there any reason to
think that these same kinds of disputes will not arise between provincial/
federal governments and the Nisga' a government? They may not arise in
the same political context as in Quebec, but it is likely that they will arise
nonetheless. The difference is that, if the existing s.35 jurisprudence is
applied, provincial and federal governments will potentially be able to
argue that the assertion of their laws is in the broader public interest and
therefore unilaterally infringe the jurisdictional agreements found in the
Agreement, rather then being forced to stay within their constitutional
jurisdiction. 92
St. Louis, supra note 85 at 384.
Joffe, supra note 83.
91
See for example 41 st Annual Premiers Conference, News Release, (August 10, 2000),
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3. Nisga'a Assertions of New Rights
Thus far, I have considered only the consequences of infringements
by non-Aboriginal governments. It is this kind of infringement that is
contemplated by the s.35 jurisprudence and specifically by the Supreme
Court of B.C. in Campbell. Such infringement would violate the express
terms of the Nisga'a Agreement. For example, s.13 of the Agreement
states that the Agreement prevails over any federal or provincial law to
the extent of any inconsistency and s.36 provides that amendments to
the Agreement may be made only with the consent of all three parties.
Presumably the argument that provincial and federal governments can
unilaterally infringe is based on s.52 of the Constitution. 93 That is, s.35 is
part of the "supreme law of Canada." If s.35, properly interpreted,
allows infringement, then this takes priority over the contrary terms of
the Agreement.
It must, however, be recognized that the Nisga'a can potentially use
the same argument. The Agreement says that it "exhaustively sets out
Nisga'a section 35 rights, the geographic extent of those rights, and the
limitations to those rights." 94 As the jurisprudence evolves, it seems
likely that other Aboriginal groups will be successful in having previously unrecognized rights recognized under s.35. Some of these may
well be rights that, in the absence of an Agreement, the Nisga'a would
have been in a position to claim. For example, if an Aboriginal right not
to pay taxes or at least not to pay taxes in certain circumstances were
recognized, 95 the Nisga'a would be barred from claiming such a right by
the Agreement, which states that the Nisga'a will lose their income tax
exemption. 96 The court could also have made a specific finding about an
Aboriginal right to a share in the fishery that surpassed the share that is
provided for in the Agreement. 97 These findings would not automati-

92

The range of valid objectives was broadened in Gladstone, supra note 13 at para. 73 to
include infringement for objectives which are "of compelling and substantial importance to
that community as a whole."
93
Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 2 at s.52:
94
Agreement, supra note 1 at c.2, s.23.
95
In Mitchell v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), [1999] I F.C. 375, 167 D.L.R. (4' 11 )
702, leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 3, the Federal Court of Appeal
found an Aboriginal right not to pay customs taxes.
96
Agreement, supra note 1 at c.16, s.6.
97
Agreement, supra note I at Schedules A and B.

20 - DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

cally apply to the Nisga'a, since Aboriginal rights are specific to the
group claiming, 98 but the only thing preventing the Nisga'a from claiming them would be the terms of the Agreement. However, if s.35 protects
those rights, then, according to the logic employed in the argument for
government infringement, that protection should take priority over the
terms of the Agreement. The Nisga' a should be able to seek a judicial
declaration of what rights are included in s.35 and enforce those rights as
a matter of constitutional law, despite the fact that they are not included
in the Agreement.
The result of such an argument is uncertain. A court might well limit
the Nisga'a to their Agreement, despite the fact that provincial and
federal governments are not so limited. For example, a court might say
that the government right to infringe treaties was paii of s.35 before the
existence of the Nisga'a treaty, while the hypothetical new s.35 rights of
the Nisga'a were not. This argument is specious in that the law is
supposed to exist independently of judicial pronouncements on the
subject. 99 Neve1iheless, this, or some other ground, might well be used
to deny the Nisga'a claim. The result of any such claim is uncertain.
Certainty and an end to litigation are undermined by the very possibility
of these kinds of claims being successful.

v. THE UNIQUE POSITION OF MODERN AGREEMENTS
1. Canadian Principles of Interpretation

Crown sovereignty implies a Crown right to infringe Aboriginal and
treaty rights. 100 In order to balance this with the prior occupation of
Aboriginal people, the courts have developed generous principles of
interpretation to protect Aboriginal people. A fiduciary responsibility
has also been imposed on the Crown to prevent it from entering into
unfair or exploitative agreements with Aboriginal people. 101 These principles have largely been formulated in the context of either undocu-
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mented Aboriginal rights or treaties that were created in a context of
extreme power imbalance. Rightly, the courts have been protective of
First Nations and have sought out principles by which they could
judicially determine what balance was required for the fair reconciliation of Aboriginal rights with Crown sovereignty.
In Nowegijick v. The Queen, the Supreme Court of Canada said that
"treaties and statutes relating to Indians should be liberally construed
and doubtful expressions resolved in favour of the Indians." 102 This
means that treaties should be considered in the complete historical and
legal context in which they were made, which involves consideration of
extrinsic evidence. 103 Treaties should be given the meaning that the
parties, particularly the Aboriginals, would have understood them to
have. Any provisions that restrict the rights of Aboriginal people should
be narrowly construed 104 and the court is not limited to the plain meaning
of the words in the text. "The honour of the Crown is always at stake in
its dealings with Aboriginal peoples," 105 and (prior to 1982) a "clear and
plain" intention is necessary to extinguish treaties. 106 These principles
have been repeated many times. 107 "Sui generis treaties are derived from
grants from Aboriginal nations to the imperial Crown," so the principles
of interpretation "require a justice who is reviewing a challenge to an
Indian treaty to move into an interpretive consciousness that allows
alternate views of time, law, and culture." 108
All of this is based, at least in part, on a foundation of inequality
between the parties. The interpretative principles are an "attempt to
overcome the limitation of existing precedent on treaties," 109 which was
developed in the context of an extreme power imbalance.

[1983] I S.C.R. 29 at 36; 144 D.L.R. (3'd) 193.
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Historically the Crown was in a position to take advantage in a
number of ways. First, the negotiating situation was one easily subverted by the Crown's representatives to further Crown interests in
acquiring ten-itory and removing both Aboriginal interests in the land
and Aboriginal peoples themselves. Second, the situation in Canada
developed within an evolving historical context marked by a growing
imbalance between Euro-Canadian settlers and Aboriginal peoples. Finally, as a result of the historic interaction between the Crown and
Aboriginal peoples, a fiduciary relationship developed, one wherein the
Crown came to exercise immense power in relation to the fundamental
interests of the Aboriginal peoples. 110
Because of this foundation of inequality, s.35 has been interpreted to
require judicial oversight of how to create the appropriate balance
between the parties. It must be understood that this is fundamentally
different from rules of interpretation applied in other contexts. The
ordinary rule of contract interpretation does not apply to agreements
with Aboriginal people. That is, that
[i]f the parties have seen fit to put their contractual intentions into
writing, it must be because they wanted their meaning to be clearly and
unequivocally established. There should be no room for argument
about what has been agreed. The written word should make plain
beyond doubt or question what were the requirements of the contract
that was entered into by the parties. 111

Nor is there a principle of deference whereby the comis could
recognize that the parties are in a better position to do the balancing then
is the court, as there is for example in judicial review of certain administrative bodies. 112 This judicial control has been necessary because of the
vulnerability of Aboriginal people and the potential for exploitation by
the Crown.
2. American Principles of Interpretation
The canons of interpretation for treaties with American Indians are
very similar to the principles used in Canada. The first rule is that "treaty
terms are to be interpreted as the Indians themselves would have under11
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stood them and according to the dictates of Justice." 113 This principle is
justified because treaties must be interpreted "as 'that unlettered people'
understood it and 'as justice and reason demand ... where power is
exerted by the strong over those whom they owe care and protection." 114
That is, "[f]rom their very weakness and helplessness there arises the
duty of protection." 115 Flowing from this is the principle that ambiguities
are to be resolved in favour of the Indians. 116 In sum, Indian treaties are
to be liberally construed in favour of the Indians. 117
The issue of interpretation of modem treaties does not technically
arise in the United States, since Congress put a stop to treaty making in
1871. 118 In the U.S., these principles of interpretation are applied primarily to pre-1871 treaties, 119 so the justifications for the principles apply to
the circumstances that existed before 1871. The language of "weakness
and helplessness" sheds light on some of the paternalistic values that
unfortunately underlie what appear to be generous principles of interpretation. "In a certain sense, tum-of-the-century legal thinking was the
embodiment of colonialism in its most mature form, animated by an
unquestioned confidence in the superiority of Western Civilization." 120
In certain contexts, protective principles of interpretation are obviously required to give effect to the spirit of the agreement that was
actually negotiated. Angela Hoeft cites negotiations with the Chippewas
as one example:
[T]he President's relationship to the Chippewa (was) that of a 'good
father' who would treat them justly, and the Chippewa reciprocated
the analogy, addressing Dodge as 'my father' and referring to themselves as his 'children.' Through their conduct and the concerns they

113
G.D. Meyers, "Different Sides of the Same Coin: A Comparative View oflndian Hunting
and Fishing Rights in the United States and Canada" (1991) I 0 UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 67 at 87, online: WL (JLR). See also A.R. Hoeft "Coming Full Circle:
American Indian Treaty Litigation from an International Human Rights Perspective" (1995)
Law and Inequality: A Journal of Theory & Practice 204 at 239.
114
Meyers, ibid. at 87, citing United States v. Winans. 1988 WL 122410 E.D.Pa., 1988.
115
S.P. McSloy, "Back to the Future: Native American Sovereignty in the 21" Century" ( 1993)
20 New York University Review of Law and Social Change 217 at 246 online: WL (JLR),
citing United States v. Kagama 118 U.S. 375 ( 1886) at 384-85.
116
Meyers, supra note 114 at 87.
117
Meyers, ibid. at 87. See also Hoeft, ibid.
118
McSloy, supra note 116 at 264.
119
The principles are also applied to "treaty-like" instruments. Meyers, supra note 114 at 88.
120
Hoeft, supra note 114 at 256.

24 - DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

raised, the Chippewa evidenced an understanding that the relationship
they were establishing with the United States would be ongoing and
that, like a 'good father,' the President invited their trust and offered
them protection. 121

In later interpretation, ambiguous phrases such as 'during the pleasure of the President' were interpreted in favour of the Band as not
granting the President an unfettered discretion. This kind of interpretation makes sense in the historical context.
3. Critique of the Principles of Interpretation

While on one hand these generous principles of interpretation are
intended to be a benefit to Aboriginal people, they can also be seen to
serve a suspect and outdated set of values. In "Reading the Colonizer's
Mind," Olufemi Taiwo argues that colonization depends on
"sociocryonics, the frozen preservation of outmoded and moribund
social fonns." 122 Colonization involves treating the colonized like perennial children and "we do not ordinarily put before children complex
social rules or expect them in infancy to comprehend the principles that
enable and justify those rules. We do not hold children responsible for
many of their actions, and we therefore exclude them from much of
responsibility discourse." 123 He uses the example of exempting the
colonized from ordinaiy British Law in order to prevent them gaining
the benefit of principles such as equality before the law. 124 He concludes
that sociocryonics
"deprived Africans of the opportunity to engage critically with their
own culture for the purposes of moving it along, expunging those
elements that had outlived their usefulness, keeping in altered forms
those that remained relevant, and generally borrowing from other
cultures whenever they felt the need for new forms that their indigenous structures lacked. 125
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Arguably, the principles of interpretation freeze Aboriginal treaty rights
in the manner in which they would have been understood in their
historical and legal context. They are also principles that apply only to
Aboriginal people and can be seen, for example, as depriving Aboriginal
people of the full value of the deals they make.
B.W. Morse points out that focusing only on how things would have
been understood in the past "tells Aboriginal people that what is relevant
about them is their past ... It also excludes what may have later become,
or what may become in the future, integral to the very survival of
Aboriginal cultures." 126 He makes the point in relation to defining Aboriginal rights, but it applies as well to interpreting treaties. Interpreting
treaties that were intended to define an ongoing relation only in their
historical context also ignores "the way in which cultures in fact evolve,
adapt and transform over time." 127
Even in the American context, where the canons of construction are
being used to interpret 19111 century treaties, Hoeft calls them "rusting
canons in a changing world." 128 She argues that trying to figure out how
the Indians would have understood a treaty requires "'reconstruction' of
an increasingly distant past,"using an academic version of history that is
an "institution of the dominant, non-native culture." 129 Most importantly, she is concerned that relying on history "reinforces cultural
stereotypes by freezing Indians in the past and ignoring the reality of
who they are today." 130
Further, Hoeft is concerned about non-natives being the ones to
interpret treaties and to decide what is in the best interest of the Aboriginal group. She says that "federal solutions have consisted of' answers to
the wrong questions, for the questions were framed by the wants and
desires of a western, expansionary society, not by the needs and values
of tribal communities. "' 131 She concludes that
One bitter result of this history is that the canons still used to protect
treaty rights from federal or state encroachment bear the imprint of
values and assumptions which run contrary to that end. At its heart, the
Morse, supra note 30 at I 031-32.
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128
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colonial paradigm is premised on the colonizer's superiority over the
colonized. Translated into judicial doctrine, the colonial paradigm
lends itself to a presumption of Native incompetence and governmental benevolence: Indian people are presumed incapable of understanding and adapting to the changes imposed by an advanced civilization,
and federal authorities are presumed capable of assessing Indian needs
and making decisions in their best interests. The twofold presumption
of Native incompetence and governmental benevolence continues to
be present in treaty litigation. 132

Many of these same issues have been pointed out in the Canadian
context. It is fine to say that treaties should be considered in their
complete context, but contexts are "neither static nor neutral; they are
constantly modified to rationalize changing regimes of European
thought." 133 It is an extremely difficult task to develop a view ofhist01y
that is truly mutual, especially when one is attempting to do so using
potentially biased historical records written in languages that incapable
of embodying Aboriginal world views. 134
Gordon Christie, among others, has argued that the application of
the principles of treaty interpretation has been inconsistent and does not
always achieve the purposes for which the principles were ostensibly
developed. In fact, he says, "the principles seem to act to reinforce ...
vulnerability." 135 As an illustration of this inconsistency, he asks
Did the signatories understand and accept that the treaties could be
violated at will by the Crown so long as it did so with a clear intent?
Why would any Aboriginal party have entered into such an absurdly
weak agreement, surrendering its birthright. . .in exchange for no real
protection? 136

These same questions, although with lesser force, could be asked about
entering into agreements expecting that they can be infringed in accord
with the Sparrow test.
As Leonard Rotman points out, "[p]art of the difficulty with the use
of these principles is that while they are well-known, the reasons for
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their existence are not." 137 Interpreting treaties in favour of Aboriginal
people was designed as a method to give effect to the true intention of
the parties, assuming that both paiiies intended to fulfill their promises, 138 not as a way to undermine that intention. '"Generous' rules of
interpretation should not be confused with a vague sense of after-thefact largesse. The special rules are dictated by the special difficulties of
asce1iaining what in fact was agreed to." 139 Treaties in general are
different from Aboriginal rights. "Treaties are analogous to contracts,
albeit of a very solemn and special, public nature. They create enforceable obligations based on the mutual consent of the parties." 140 The goal
should always be to dete1mine the true intentions of the parties.
A paternalistic system whereby governments and judges determine
what is best for Aboriginal people does not help to determine the true
intent of equal parties with equal legal rights. Resolving contractual
ambiguities in favour of Aboriginal people presumes they are not able to
say what they mean and mean what they say, as is expected of everyone
else. The fiduciary doctrine assumes that it is easy to take advantage of
Aboriginal people and that they always need a special level of protection
that is otherwise usually afforded to children, people receiving medical
care, and others in special positions of vulnerability. 141 Surely it cannot
be assumed that the entire population of Aboriginal people have always
and will always be in need of this special protection. Where the facts do
not support the need for protection, applying protective principles is
simply stereotyping and is not in the long-term interests of Aboriginal
people.
4. Application to Modern Treaties
In Eastmain Band v. Canada (Federal Administrator) in the context
of the JBNQA, the Federal Comi of Appeal said that:
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We must be careful, in construing a document as modem as the 197 5
Agreement, that we do not blindly follow the principles laid down by
the Supreme Court in analyzing treaties entered into in an earlier era.
The principle that ambiguities must be construed in favour of the
Aboriginals rests, in the case of historic treaties, on the unique vulnerability of the Aboriginal parties, who were not educated and were
compelled to negotiate with parties who had a superior bargaining
position, in languages and with legal concepts which were foreign to
them and without adequate representation.

In this case, there was simply no such vulnerability. The Agreement
is the product of a long and difficult process of negotiation. The benefits
received and concessions made by the Aboriginal parties were received
and given freely, after serious thought, in a situation which was, to use
their counsel's expression, one of 'give and take. ' 142
This decision has been criticized for overestimating the degree of
equality between the parties. In 1975 Aboriginal rights remained subject
to unilateral extinguishment by the federal government, as they were at
all times prior to receiving constitutional protection in 1982. 143 In their
strong critique of Eastmain, Hutchins and Schulze point out that the
situation is not really equal when one party can unilaterally take the
rights being defined away. "[I]t is not so much the relative positions of
the parties negotiating the treaty which is determinative. Rather it is the
legal - and moral - context in which the treaty is negotiated, as well as
the context established by the treaty instrument which may result in
legal vulnerability for one of the parties." 144
5. Application to the Nisga'a Treaty
Post-1982 the legal and moral context has changed, and the conclusion in Eastmain has become much more compelling. In 1982, the
Nisga'a gained the bargaining chip of legally enforceable rights that
were not within the control of the provincial and federal governments.
Both parties knew that that if an agreement was not reached, the courts
142
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could simply enforce Nisga'a rights regardless of the consequences for
other levels of government. After Delgamukw, the parties knew that the
courts were willing to take that step if negotiations were unsuccessful.
The Nisga'a negotiated with what is perhaps an unprecedented degree of
equality in terms of knowledge and resources. The negotiations had
been ongoing since just after the Calder decision in 1973. They had
experienced negotiators and financial resources. The Agreement is the
product of a vigorous defence of each party's interests by both parties. In
this context, significantly more weight should be given to the actual
agreement of the parties and significantly less to the traditional s.35
analysis, which is based on inequality between the parties.
The Agreement itself makes it clear that it is not intended to be
treated like any other treaty under s.35. For example, "[t]here is no
presumption that doubtful expressions, terms or provisions in this
Agreement are to be resolved in favour of any particular party." 145 As
discussed earlier, the parties included the limitations and justifications
that they thought were appropriate within the terms of the Agreement,
rather than leaving that to be dealt with by way of judicial interpretation
under s.35. In this case, applying the principles of interpretation would
be a refusal to acknowledge "what in fact was agreed to." 146
There are also external guides that suggest the parties intended the
Agreement to be treated differently. The Federal Policy Guide on Aboriginal Self-Government says that Aboriginal self-government may
change the nature of the Crown's "unique, historic, fiduciary relationship with Aboriginal peoples in Canada. 147 The policy states that:
In circumstances where Aboriginal groups wish the Crown to have
certain ongoing obligations, self-government jurisdiction or authority
will, correspondingly, be limited. In such cases, continuing Crown
obligations should be clearly defined. There is no justifiable basis for
the Government to retain fiduciary obligations in relation to subject
matters over which it has relinquished its control and over which an
Aboriginal government or institution has, correspondingly, assumed
control. 148
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Through this Policy Guide, the federal government has expressed its
intention to relinquish control. This is inconsistent with an intention to
maintain the "residual power" to pass laws that "may infringe upon
aboriginal rights." 149 That residual power requires that the fiduciary
obligation be retained in all its force in order to justify such infringements. It would be ironic indeed if treaties could decrease the Crown's
responsibilities and consequently make it easier for the Crown to infringe them in a manner consistent with their now reduced fiduciary
responsibility. Rather, the fiduciaiy responsibility that "evolve[s] as a
natural consequence both of Aboriginal peoples' changing roles in
shaping their own lives and communities, and of the Crown's diminished control and authority in relation to the them" 150 should become a
tool that can be used to ensure that governments honour the agreements
they have entered.
The Federal Policy Guide is not an authoritative source from which
to determine what effect the Agreement has on the Crown's fiduciary
obligation. The government cannot wish their fiduciary obligation
away. But it is an important indicia of what the parties are attempting to
achieve through negotiations. There is also some academic support for
the idea that "the Treaty will ... secure a measure of autonomy for the
Nisga' a, [and therefore] the fiduciary obligations of the federal and
provincial governments will lessen." 151 The bottom line is that if the
courts do not allow the parties to achieve their goals, there will be no
incentive to negotiate, and the purpose of s. 35 and of reconciliation
through treaty making is undermined.

VI. CONCLUSION
The underlying theme behind both the Sparrow test for justifying
infringements of treaty rights, and generous principles of interpretation
in favour of Aboriginal people, is judicial supervision. The courts will
determine what kinds of objectives are sufficient to justify the infringement of a treaty right and what standards the justification must meet.
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The courts will determine what the parties must have meant, what is
consistent with the honour of the Crown, and what is in the best interests
of Aboriginal people. This supervisory role is understandable, indeed
even necessary, in the context of inherently unequal parties. A neutral
third party is required to protect the interests of the vulnerable. But as the
courts have recognized, reconciliation is better served by agreement
between the parties than by judicially imposed solutions. The corollary
is that once such reconciliation is achieved, with all the compromises
and concessions that entails, the court should give effect to the intentions of the parties and intervene as little as possible.

